Overbidding vs fire-sales in bankruptcy auctions by Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S.
Overbidding vs  resales in bankruptcy auctions
B  Espen Eckbo and Karin S  Thorburn
 
Amos Tuck School of Business Administration
Dartmouth College
Hanover  NH 
USA
First draft  July 
This version  June 
Abstract
We analyze bidding incentives of the main creditor  bank in Swedish bankruptcy auctions
Absent a direct mechanism for enforcing its seller reservation price the bank oers nancing
to a potential bidder in return for a bid strategy that maximizes the expected prots of the
bankbidder coalition The coalition overbids  in excess of the coalitions private valuation by
an amount that is decreasing in the banks liquidation recovery This is the recovery if the
bank were to receive the piecemeal liquidation value announced by the auctioneer at the start
of the auction Since both the liquidation recovery and the nal goingconcern auction premium
are observable the overbidding theory is testable We perform a largesample crosssectional
analysis where overbidding is picthed against assetre sale arguments The latter hold that
auctions tend to produce lower goingconcern premiums when taking place during industry
wide nancial distress or when the rm is sold back to old owners or to industry outsiders The
evidence is strongly consistent with overbidding but provides little support for asset resale
arguments
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  Introduction
Firms resolve  nancial distress ex post through informal renegotiations private workouts or court
supervised one shoe  ts all bankruptcy procedures The optimal design of such procedures is an
important but controversial issue For reasons that are not well understood dierent bankruptcy
systems have evolved in dierent countries with a recent trend toward the structured bargaining
process characterizing the US code This code substantially restricts the liquidation rights of
creditors a Chapter 		  ling triggers automatic stay of debt payments prevents repossession of
collateral and allows the bankrupt  rm to raise new debt with superpriority debtorinpossession
 nancing In contrast the UK has developed a contractdriven receivership system where creditor
rights are enforced almost to the letter Here assets pledged as collateral can be repossessed even
if they are vital for the  rm and there is no stay of debt claims This makes it extremely di
cult
to continue to operate the distressed  rm under receivership
A third hybrid system has been developed in the small rm environment in Sweden On the
one hand the Swedish code maintains the strong protection of the  rm as a going concern also
found in the US stay of debt and collateral and the possibility of superpriority debt  nancing
On the other hand as in the UK courtsupervised renegotiation of the senior or secured debt is
not an option Instead the  ling  rm is turned over to a courtappointed trustee who arranges an
open auction Bids in this auction are for individual assets piecemeal liquidation or for the entire
 rm as a going concern All bids must be in cash and the auction proceeds are distributed strictly
according to absolute priority The cash requirement notwithstanding the auctions typically attract
multiple bidders shown below
We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the workings of the Swedish bankruptcy
auctions This issue is important as it addresses the puzzling reluctance of most countries to rely
on auctions as a bankruptcy procedure
 
As suggested by Hart  if capital markets work well
auctions should generate an ex post e
cient resolution of bankruptcy

Indeed Thorburn 
shows that Swedish auctions are quick on average two months and coste
cient and argues that
direct costs of auctions are substantially lower than the  rmsizeadjusted direct costs of large
 
I	m not aware of any groupmanagement shareholders creditors or workerswho is pushing for cash auctions
Hart 

While not the focus of this paper we discuss briey the issue of ex ante eciency of an auction bankruptcy
system in Section 
 below
	
 rm Chapter 		 proceedings Moreover she reports that threequarters of the  rms are sold as
going concerns a  rm survivorship rate that is comparable to that reported for Chapter 		 White
	 Thorburn 	 further shows that the  rms surviving the auction perform at par with
their nonbankrupt industry rivals This is in contrast with the evidence in Hotchkiss 	 where
 rms emerging from Chapter 		 on average underperform their respective industries
However Shleifer and Vishny 	 and Aghion Hart and Moore 	 warn that bankruptcy
auctions may be disadvantaged by problems of liquidity and lack of competition possibly resulting
in the  rm being sold at relatively low  resale prices Speci cally if bankruptcy auctions coin
cide with industrywide  nancial distress potential industry buyers may be credit constrained leav
ing relatively lowvaluation industry outsiders to purchase the  rm Or as modeled by Stromberg
 the main creditor may have incentives to preempt the auction and put the bankrupt  rm
back to its former owners a saleback at terms detrimental to junior creditors

The low transac
tion costs notwithstanding creditors will be reluctant to rely on auctions if structured bargaining
is believed to produce substantially greater overall debt recovery Since systematic evidence on the
 resale hypothesis in the context of bankruptcy auctions is virtually nonexistent the issue remains
controversial

A basic insight of this paper is that the scope for  resales in bankruptcy auctions is reduced by
the bidding incentives of the bankrupt  rms main creditor henceforth the bank

Generally
it is in the banks interest to both increase liquidity by oering bid  nancing and to assist
the auction in order to increase the expected auction premium These incentives appear to have
been overlooked in the literature on auction  resales The key issue for our empirical analysis
is whether these incentives as modeled below are su
cient to counter tendencies for  resales in
Swedish bankruptcy auctions
Under Swedish rules the bank can neither bid directly in the auction nor refuse to sell to the
winning bidder Thus it cannot directly enforce its reservation price as a monopolist seller

In the empirical analysis below we show that salebacks as de ned by Stromberg in fact take place in substantial
competition with other interested bidders and lead to normal auction premiums

There is some evidence on the  resale hypothesis based on asset sales by  nancially distressed  rms in the US
Pulvino   nds that sales of aircrafts under conditions of distress on average produce prices that are lower than a
theoretical benchmark price while nondistressed sales do not exhibit a discount Conditional on his hedonic pricing
model being correctly speci ed his evidence supports  resale arguments Maksimovic and Phillips  examine
company plant closures and sales in and out of Chapter  and conclude against the  resale hypothesis

As discussed below the bankrupt  rm in Sweden typically has only a single banking relationship and this bank
owns roughly onethird of the debt claims

However the bank can inuence the auction outcome by  nancing a bidder in return for a bid
strategy that maximizes the bankbidder coalitions expected revenue We show that this optimal
bid equals the revenuemaximizing reservation price by a monopolist seller constrained by the face
value of debt Under certain conditions the bankbidder coalition optimally bids higher than the
private valuation of the banks coalition partner overbidding Successful overbidding leads to a
wealth transfer from bidders other than the coalition partner and thus leaves the bank better o
relative to remaining a passive bystander to the auction
Our theoretical analysis is closely related to the literature on toehold bidding in takeovers ie
optimal bidding strategies when one or more bidders have an equity ownership position toehold
in the target  rm Bidding with an equity toehold means that the bidder plays the role of seller
of the toehold should another bidder win the auction As shown by Burkart 	 and Singh
	 in the context of auctions with uncorrelated private bidder valuations as well as by Bulow
Huang and Klemperer 	 in a commonvalue setting the expected gain on the toehold raises
the bidders ex ante valuation and may lead to aggressive bidding As indicated by the large
sample empirical analysis of Betton and Eckbo  toehold eects in inter rm tender oers are
signi cant For example toehold bidding lowers the winning premium increases the probability of
success on the  rst bid and appears to lower the overall cost of the takeover Toehold eects in
the context of bankruptcies are also modeled in Hotchkiss and Mooradian 	 They focus on a
creditormanagement coalition seeking to buy a  rm out of Chapter 		 and show that the optimal
bid depends on the face value of debt held by other creditors
Our theoretical bidding analysis yields a unique testable crosssectional prediction Proposition
 This prediction exploits the fact that the trustee announces a professional estimate of the
 rms piecemeal liquidation value the sum of the secondhand market values of each asset if
sold piecemeally at the beginning of the auction This liquidation value estimate thus forms an
observable starting point for bidding Bids can be for the  rm as a going concern or for the
 rms assets piecemeally

Our model implies that the expected amount of overbidding is lower the
greater the banks debt recovery should the auction result in piecemeal liquidation Since the eect
of overbidding is to raise the premium over the initial liquidation value paid by the winning bidder

We show empirically that the  nal auction price is on average within  of the initial liquidation value estimate
when the auction results in a piecemeal sale Thus the trustee	s liquidation value estimate is on average very precise

a regression of the observed winning auction premium on the banks recovery at the liquidation
value estimate should yield a negative coe
cient In the same regression we test the overbidding
theory against  resale arguments by including additional factors related to industry distress the
business cycle and the identity of the buyer Empirically we  nd strong support for the overbidding
theory and no support for asset  resale arguments possibly because the eect of overbidding is to
counteract tendencies for asset re sales
The rest of the paper is organized as follows Section  derives optimal bidding strategies for
a coalition between the bank and a bidder in the auction and summarizes the central empirical
hypothesis to be tested Section  provides a description of the Swedish auction bankruptcy system
and of our data Section  presents test of key hypotheses related to the banks bidding and
re nancing behavior as well as the asset  resale hypothesis Section  links our results to the
literature on optimal bankruptcy procedures while Section  concludes the paper
 A theory of overbidding in bankruptcy auctions
Swedish bankruptcy law mandates a  rstprice open auction of the  ling  rm A wellestablished
result of auction theory is that with costless bidding the price paid by the winning bidder in such
an auction equals the price paid in a secondprice sealedbid auction

In the following we follow
Burkart 	 and use the secondprice auction analogy and we assume that the number of bidders
is exogenously given at two Bidder i values the bankrupt  rm at v
i
  v
l
  
i
 i  	  where v
l
is a
known constanthenceforth labeled the piecemeal liquidation valueand  
i
is a private valuation
distributed iid with distribution and density functions G and g respectively The private valuation
may be thought of as unique synergy eects emanating from the bidders specialized resources when
combined with the bankrupt  rm
Given that the piecemeal liquidation value is known the auction establishes the price to be
paid for the right to generate the bidders private goingconcern value In this auction setting
it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid its private valuation Thus the  rm is sold for
p  minv
 
 v

 as long as the bank remains a passive bystander This ratchet solution Hirshleifer
	 yields a lower bound on the recovery generated by the auction

See eg Klemperer  for a review of auction theory

As mentioned earlier the bank is restricted from placing direct bids for the auctioned  rm and
it cannot refuse to sell to the winning bidder However suppose the bank oers to  nance bidder 	
in return for a bid strategy p
c
that maximizes the expected return to the bankbidder coalition As
shown in Proposition 	 under certain conditions the coalition overbids p
c
 v
 
 The reason is
that overbidding raises the expected winning auction price and thus the banks expected recovery
Proposition   Coalition bidding strategy Suppose that the bank is the sole
member of its creditor class  and dene
p
 
  v
 

	Gp
 

gp
 

 	
Moreover  let b denote the face value of the banks debt claim and s the face value of all
claims senior to the bank The bank forms a coalition with a bidder here bidder  and
implements the following bidding strategy
p
c

 













v
 
if p
 
 s Region I no overbidding
p
 
if s  p
 
 s b Region II full overbidding
s b if v
 
 s b  p
 
Region III partial overbidding
v
 
if v
 
 s b Region IV no overbidding

Proof Figure 	 illustrates how the optimal bankbidder coalition price varies with the value of
v
 
in the presence of creditors that are either senior s or junior to the bank

For simplicity the
value of v
l
is normalized to zero in the  gure We start the proof with Region II since this is the
region that de nes the unconstrained full overbidding price p
c
 p
 

Region II s  p
 
 s b In this region the banks claim is impaired but it expects to receive
some recovery If the coalition loses bidder  pays p
c
and the bank recovers p
c
 s after paying
o senior debt If the coalition wins it receives v
 
in return for paying p

 and the bank recovers
p

 s Thus the net coalition pro t from winning is v
 
 s The expected coalition pro t 
c
from

In the sample studied below the bank	s claim is typically junior only to a small amount of toppriority debt
claims

bidding p
c
is therefore

c
 p
c
 s	Gp
c
  v
 
 sGp
c
  p
c
	Gp
c
  v
 
Gp
c
 s 
Maximizing with respect to p
c
yields the  rstorder condition

c
p
c
 	Gp
c
 p
c
gp
c
  v
 
gp
c
   
which produces an optimal coalition price of p
c
 p
 
 Thus in Region II the coalition fully
overbids

Region I p
 
 s In this region the bank expects zero recovery Since every dollar overbidding
is captured by creditors senior to the bank it immediately follows that the coalition should not
overbid Formally the coalitions expected pro t is

c

Z
p
c
	
v
 
 p

gp

dp

 
and the  rstorder condition

c
p
c
 v
 
 p
c
gp
c
   
which implies that the optimal bid is p
c
 v
 

Region III v
 
 s  b  p
 
 In this case the price p
 
is suboptimal because the dierence
p
 
 s b represents a pure transfer from the coalition to creditors junior to the bank Thus the
maximum coalition price in this region equals s b This is also the minimum price because it is
optimal to overbid towards p
 
 In sum in Region III p
c
 s b the coalition partially overbids
Region IV v
 
 s b In this case any overbidding is a pure transfer to junior creditors and

To ensure uniqueness G must be twice continuously dierentiable and satisfy the monotonicity condition
 
 v
gv
 Gv
 
For the case of the uniform distribution the optimal bid simpli es to
p
 

v
 
 



the optimal coalition price equals v
 
 Formally the expected coalition pro t is given by

c

Z
s
	
v
 
 p

gp

dp

 v
 
 sGs bGs 
Z
p
c
s
b
v
 
 b p

gp

dp

 b	Gp
c


The  rstorder condition is

c
p
c
 v
 
 b p
c
gp
c
 bgp
c
  v
 
 p
c
gp
c
   
which yields as the optimal price p
c
 v
 
no overbidding
As shown in Lemma 	 the coalition pricing strategy in Region II full overbidding eectively
mimics the optimal takeitorleaveit selling price p
m
of a monopolist seller with a private valuation
v
m
 v
 

Lemma   Monopolist seller Suppose the seller faces a single bidder whose private
value v is distributed according to Gv Moreover  suppose that the monopolist foregoes
the value v
m
by selling the rm Then  the optimal reservation price for takeitorleave
it o	er to purchase the bankrupt rm equals
p
m
 v
m

	Gp
m

gp
m

 
Proof Figure  shows the optimal price of a monopolist seller in a standard pricequantity
diagram As in Klemperer  the quantity sold horizontal axis is the probability 	Gp
of selling the  rm at an auction price p A sales price of p yields expected revenue of R  p	Gp
and expected marginal revenue of Rp  	 Gp  pgp The monopolists expected cost of
selling the  rm is C  v
m
	 Gp Thus the expected marginal cost equals Cp  v
m
gp
and equating marginal revenue with marginal costs yields p
m

Enforcing p
m
means refusing to sell the  rm or its assets at a price below p
m
 The bankruptcy
auctioneer whose  duciary responsibility is to maximize total creditor recovery will in practice
consider any bid value in excess of the piecemeal liquidation value v
l
 Thus as a passive bystander
the bank expects to receive the lower price equal to the secondhighest bidders valuation the

ratchet solution Lemma 	 shows that the bidder coalition strategy of Proposition 	 mimics
subject to the constraints imposed by the face value of other creditor classesthe monopolist seller
price
The presence of multiple creditors in the banks creditor class alters the optimal coalition
strategy in Proposition 	 To see how suppose the bank holds the fraction     	 of the total
claims b in the class
 	
As shown in Lemma  this reduces the coalitions overbidding
Lemma  Multiple creditors The smaller the fraction  of the claims in the
banks debt class that is owned by the bank  the smaller the amount of overbidding by
the bankbidder coalition
p
 
 
 v
 
 
	Gp
 

gp
 

 	
Proof The banks recovery is now scaled with the constant  ie the coalition realizes p
c
 s
if losing and v
 
 p

 p

 s if winning Thus the expected payo equals

c
 p
c
	Gp
c
  v
 
Gp
c
 	 
Z
p
c
	
p

gp

dp

 s 		
The  rstorder condition is

c
p
c
 	Gp
c
  v
 
gp
c
 p
c
gp
c
   	
which yields the optimal coalition bid p
 
 

  
The above analysis assumes that the banks coalition partner bidder 	 agrees to a bidding
strategy that maximizes the total coalition payo In a competitive capital market where borrowers
and lenders are symmetrically informed bidder 	 derives no net bene t or cost from the coalition
strategy and is thus indierent In this case the bank bears the full cost of overbidding Lemma 
 	
Hotchkiss and Mooradian  examine analogous bidding incentives of a managementcreditor coalition that
seek to acquire a  rm out of Chapter  in the US In their context  would be the proportion of the total creditor
class	 claims owned by the managementbidder coalition Buyouts of this type are rare in Chapter 
  
With uniform distributions over  
p
 
 

v
 
 
  

Note also that the expression for p
 
 
is identical to the optimal bid by a toehold bidder derived by Burkart 
 in
the context of takeovers

shows the magnitude of these costs
Lemma  Overbidding cost The expected overbidding cost is given by
Z
p
c
v
 
p

 v
 
gp

dp

 p
c
 v
 
gp
c
 	
Proof As shown in Figure  there are three mutually exclusive outcomes of the coalition over
bidding Notice  rst that overbidding implies zero costs to the coalition when it loses Figure
a Second overbidding is costless when the coalition wins and pays p

 v
 
Figure b Third
overbidding is costly if the coalition wins and pays a price p

 v
 
Figure c As indicated in
Figure  this is also the only auction outcome that implies an ine
cient allocation of the bankrupt
 rm
 
Thus as stated in the lemma the expected cost of overbidding equals p

 v
 
times the
probability that bidder s private valuation v

falls in the interval v
 
 p
c
 Alternatively one could
also derive the same expression for the expected overbidding cost by integrating the area in Figure
 under the demand curve over the price range v
m
 p
m
 ie the usual deadweight losstriangle
of monopoly
There are several possible ways for the bank to compensate bidder 	 for the overbidding cost
The bank may for example contract to reduce the face value of the banks debt claim issued
on bidder 	 by the full amount of the coalitions overbidding cost should the outcome in Figure
c materialize This works in our model since the bank has learned the true value of v
 
at the
beginning of the auction as an input to computing p
c

 
The discussion so far has focused exclusively on the banks incentive to overbid However it is
not uncommon for the owners of small  rms to raise bank  nancing by personally guaranteeing the
bank loan If such an owner decides to bid for the bankrupt  rm the bidder has similar incentives
to overbid also without forming a bankbidder coalition This follows because the greater bank
recovery resulting from successful overbidding also reduces the equityholders liability visavis
 
Consistent with the actual institutional setup in Sweden it is assumed that bidders cannot simply withdraw
renege on the winning bid at this point See Singh  for an analysis of how allowing the wining bidder to
renege may impact optimal bids
 
If the bank and bidder  are asymmetrically informed about the true value of v
 
 the analysis is more complicated
Now bidder  may have an incentive to understate v
 
it is easily veri ed that bidder  has nothing to gain from
overstating v
 
 Understating v
 
increases the expected compensation bidder  receives from the bank for the cost
of overpayment The tradeo is that lowering v
 
also reduces p
c
and thus the probability that bidder  will capture
the private bene t of running the auctioned  rm

the bank Thus overbidding may occur even in the absence of a bankbidder coalition Moreover
if a bankbidder coalition is formed with a bidder that has a personal loan guarantee then the
above analysis goes through with the exception that the bank no longer compensates the coalition
bidder for the full overbidding cost These results are summarized in Lemma 
Lemma  Personal loan guarantee If a bidder has issued a personal loan guaran
tee  then this bidder has an incentive to overbid without forming a bankbidder coalition
Moreover  in the event that the bank forms a coalition with such a bidder  the bank no
longer compensates the bidder for the full value of the overbidding costs
The analysis so far has taken the piecemeal liquidation value v
l
as given We now analyze how
the incentive to overbid changes with changes in v
l
 This analysis produces the main crosssectional
implication of the paper namely that the going concern premium p v
l
 on average is greater the
lower v
l
 To see this we  rst show that the expected amount of coalition overbidding is decreasing
in v
l

Proposition  Expected overbidding and liquidation values For liquidation
values v
l
 s b  the expected coalition overbidding  Ep
c
 v
 
  is decreasing in v
l

Proof Recall from Proposition 	 that the bank has an incentive to form a coalition and overbid
only when v
 
 s  b ie when  
 
  
 
 
  maxs  b  v
l
  Thus for a given v
l
 the expected
amount of overbidding is computed by integrating p
c
 v
 
over the range   
 
 
 This is equivalent
to computing the area in Figure 	 under p
c
and above v
 
from v
l
up to s b
 
Ep
c
 v
 
 
Z


 
	
s b v
l
  
 
d 
 

Z

 
 


 
	G 
 

g 
 

d 
 
 	
where  

 
 sbv
l

 G
 

g
 

  
 
 
 ie the breakpoint between Region II and III in Figure 	 where
p
 
 s b Proposition  follows directly from the fact that the integral limit  
 
 
is decreasing in
v
l

Proposition  is stated in terms of the overbidding p
c
 v
 
which is not empirically observable
Lemma  transforms Proposition  into observables and thus provides the main empirically testable
implication of our theory
 
As noted above in Figure  v
l
  A value of v
l
  simply moves origo towards the right holding s and b
constant
	
Lemma  Going concern premia and liquidation recovery rates The going
concern premium in excess of the piecemeal liquidation value  pv
l
  where p is the price
paid by the winning bidder  is decreasing in the banks recovery rate at the liquidation
value  r
l
  minmaxv
l
 sb  	
Proof First it follows immediately that since Ep
c
 v
 
 is decreasing in v
l
Proposition 
Ep  v
l
  Ep  v
l
is also decreasing in v
l
 Again when the coalition overbids and loses the
price p is greater than the price p  v
 
implied by no overbidding When the coalition overbids and
wins p  v

 In sum with overbidding p  minv
 
 v

 Since expected overbidding decreases with
v
l
 Ep also decreases with v
l
 Alternatively in regions with overbidding II and III in Figure 	
r
l
v
l
 
 
Thus the existence of overbidding as de ned by Proposition 	 can be empirically tested by
regressing the observable goingconcern premium p  v
l
on the banks liquidation recovery rate r
l
which is also observable We now turn to our empirical examination of Lemma  and other related
hypotheses
 Auction environment and sample characteristics
  Auction environment
Figure  illustrates key potential outcomes in a Swedish  rms process towards being sold in a
bankruptcy auction starting with the point of insolvency The insolvent  rm ie a  rm where the
face value of debt claims exceeds the market value of the assets may  rst consider attempting to use
the composition option event 	 provided by Swedish insolvency law This option allows the  rm
to renegotiate the debt claims of unsecured creditors only which on average constitute onethird of
the  rms debt The bulk of the secured claims is typically held by the  rms main bank
 
Not
surprisingly successful composition is elusive as secured creditors typically onethird of the total
 
Since for   r
l
  
 
 
 b  r
l
 the limit 
 
 
and thus the expected amount of overbidding is decreasing in
r
l

 
In Sweden it is common for small  rms to have a single bank This bank holds all of the secured and some of
the unsecured debt As in most of Western Europe bank  nancing often take the form of socalled oatingcharge
secured debt The collateral supporting oating charge secured debt are included in the general term movable
assets Swedish rorliga tillgangar Movable assets include items such as accounts receivables patents and other
intellectual property as well as certain assets that can be seized by the creditor eg machinery and inventory but
not cash and securities In contrast  xedcharge collateral refers to assets speci ed in the covenants of the debt
contract eg real estate buildings and vessels In the US secured debt refers to  xedcharge collateral only
		
debt and priority claims such as taxes and wages are not part of the proposal and need not agree
unless they are oered full repayment Since anything less than full repayment would imply a wealth
transfer from secured to unsecured creditors composition is almost never attempted Indeed Eckbo
and Thorburn  report  bankruptcy  lings but only four successful composition attempts
in the population of 	  nancially distressed Swedish  rms with at least  employees during
	
As an alternative the  rm may explore the potential for negotiating an outofcourt sale of
the  rms assets as a going concern event  This negotiation is typically initiated by the owner
manager and is subject to approval by secured creditors Following this sale the  rm is still
insolvent the cash proceeds from the sale are necessarily less than the face value of outstanding
debt and must thus  le for bankruptcy event  This  ling represents a prepackaged bankruptcy
solution henceforth auction prepack since the assets have already been sold The asset sale
is typically completed the day beforeor on the day ofthe bankruptcy  ling The role of the
bankruptcy court in this instance is primarily to allow junior creditors to object to the sale and if
the sale is overturned to organize an open auction Empirically auction prepack  lings are almost
never overturned
 
When  ling for regular auction bankruptcy event  the control of the  rm is transfered
to an independent courtappointed trustee with  duciary responsibility to creditors Trustees
are certi ed by a government supervisory authority Tillsynsmyndigheten i Konkurs or TSM
which also reviews the trustees compensation and performance Poorly performing trustees eg
in terms of their eorts to maintain the bankruptcy auction risk losing their license Trustees are
also subject to the wrath of major creditors should they fail to hold a proper armslength auction
procedure This constraint is particularly relevant in the case of a saleback to the old owners
Trustees are compensated on an hourly basis The trustee organizes the sale of the  rm in an
auction which in our sample below lasts an average of  days This auction results in either the
 rm being liquidated piecemeally event  or sold as a going concern event 
Financially distressed  rms and the buyer selfselect the path in Figure  depending on  rm
 
Thorburn  shows that auction prepacks have signi cantly lower direct costs than a regular bankruptcy
 ling Thus it is natural to assume that a regular auction bankruptcy  ling event  signals a failed prepack
attempt or that the  rm has insucient goingconcern value Prepack attempts may fail due to insucient time to
line up a buyer and creditor support
	
speci c characteristics Using the sample described below a multinomial logit model reveals that
the probability of piecemeal liquidation increases with the fraction of the total debt that is secured
a proxy for the  rms tangible assets and is higher for bankruptcy  lings during the 		 business
cycle downturn Auction prepacks are more likely the larger the  rm and the greater the proportion
secured debt The probability of a going concern sale is greater the greater the number of oating
charge debtholders possibly because increasing cost of debtholder coordination tend to prevent
prepack arrangements
 
In the auction a goingconcern sale takes place by merging the assets
and operations of the  rm into a receiving company set up or held by the buyer akin to a leverage
buyout transaction
 
The method of payment is restricted to cash and creditors are paid according
to the absolute priority of their claims
While in bankruptcy the  rm is protected by an automatic stay of creditors ie debt service
is halted and creditors cannot seize collateral Furthermore debtorinpossession  nancing is
permitted allowing the  rm to raise new debt with superpriority status
	
In practice however
bankrupt  rms tend to cover operating expenses by increasing their debt obligations in the form
of trade credits which get superpriority while new debt issues or bank loans are almost never
observed
  Data sources and characteristics
The starting point for our sample of Swedish bankruptcies is the original Stromberg and Thorburn
	 data base also underlying Thorburn  	 and Stromberg  This data set in
 
The text reports results for the signi cant coecients only Let 
n
x
j
 denote the probability of auction outcome
n conditional on some vector of  rmspeci c characteristics x
j
 We estimate 
n
x
j
 across the n     outcomes
piecemeal liquidation auction prepack and goingconcern sale
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where 
n
is the estimated coecients Since the probabilities sum to one a change in the kth oer characteristic
changes all three probabilities simultaneously so that the partial for one probability becomes
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Our inferences are based on this partial and the associated tvalues The full results of the multinomial estimation
was shown in an earlier version of this paper and is available upon request
 
Thus the  rm	s assets are transferred to the buyout  rm while the debt claims remain on the books of the  rm
in bankruptcy
	
We thank Torgny Hastad Swedish Supreme Court judge and former professor of law at the University of Uppsala
for assistance in interpreting the legal code
	
cludes a total of  bankruptcies from 			 selected from a population of 		 bankrupt
 rms having at least  employees The source of the population is UpplysningsCentralen AB
UC and the StrombergThorburn sample is restricted to bankruptcies in the four largest admin
istrative provinces in Sweden including the countrys three main metropolitan areas Stockholm
Gothenburg and Malmo The sample  rms are among the largest in Sweden only  of Swedish
corporations have  employees or more All  rms are privately held and most have concentrated
ownership
 
Table 	 shows the number of cases across the outcomes depicted in Figure  Of the 
bankrupt  rms in the sample    succeeded in performing a prepack while the remaining
 submitted a regular auction bankruptcy  ling Of  regular  lings    are liquidated
piecemeal and 	 	  are sold as a going concern

The sample  rms represent more than
 dierent digit SIC groups with  in manufacturing industries  in construction and
wholesale industries 	 in the hotel and restaurant industry 	 in the transportation industry
and the balance of  scattered across a number of other industries
StrombergThorburn collect casespeci c information from the o
cial bankruptcy  les kept by
TSM These  les do not contain information on key characteristics for this paper such as the
number of bidders the duration number of days of the auction and the  nancing of the winning
bid old bank versus new bank We requested this information directly from each individual trustee
and received it for 	 individual auctions As shown in  gures  and  and Table 	 these auctions
show a substantial number of both potential and actual bidders across both goingconcern sales and
piecemeal liquidations Moreover the auctions appear active also for the subsample of salebacks to
the old ownermanagement The one exception is the prepack category where as explained above
the trustee simply approves an existing bid and rarely solicits additional bids
Figure  shows the frequency distribution of the number of interested bidders for 	 cases
where the  rm was sold as a going concern An interested bidder is a party that contacts the
trustee and expresses an interest in bidding The number of interested bidders ranges from one to
forty and  of the cases attracted multiple bidder interest The average number of interested
 
The sample  rms are small in absolute terms The book value of total assets one year prior to  ling averages

 million and the number of employees averages 

Three regular  lings cannot be classi ed as to their goingconcernsale status due to insucient information in
the court documents
	
bidders equals  with a median of  Table 	
As shown in Figure  the substantial expression of interest translates into multiple bids in a
majority of the auctions The average number of actual bids in goingconcern sales equals  with
a median of  Table 	 As expected the number of bidders in auctions leading to piecemeal
sale of the  rms assets is greater than for goingconcern sales The average median number of
interested bidders in piecemeal sales is 		  while the corresponding number of actual bids is
  Table 	 indicates that auctions resulting in saleback to the old ownermanagement also
exhibit substantial competition with an average median number of interested and actual bidders
of   and  	 respectively
We also collect information on the old banks decision to  nance the bidder in goingconcern auc
tions This information is drawn from the trustees responses and from Thorburn  where the
data source is the national register of corporate oating charge claims Inskrivningsmyndigheten
for foretagsinteckning Of the  going concern sales listed in Table 	 the bank  nancing of
the winning bid is identi ed for 			 cases The old bank  nances the winning bidder in half 
of the cases Similarly the old owner receives bid  nancing from the old bank in about half of
the saleback cases

We also incorporate the information on equity ownership of incumbent CEOs
compiled by Thorburn   of the CEOs own 	 or more of their respective  rms equity
and  are controlling shareholders  ownership or more
Our measures of industry distress discussed below is based on the  nancial statements of the
entire population of more than 	 Swedish  rms with at least  employees The industry is
de ned on a digit level

The source of this information is UC The industry information is also
used to estimate the relative accounting operating performance of bankrupt  rms
Finally we extend the StrombergThorburn data base with information from Statistics Sweden
on the business cycle We construct an equalweighted monthly composite business cycle index from
the producer price index the gross national product aggregate consumption rate of unemployment
and total number of bankruptcy  lings All variables are normalized with their mean and standard
deviations before entering the business cycle index Over the sample period 			 the
period  was a period of general business upturn followed by deep recession and real estate

There is no signi cant correlation between the identity of the winning bidder old or new owners and the source
of bank  nancing old or new bank

Swedish industry classi cations mirrors the SIC code system used in the US
	
crisis in 		 The economic downturn continued in 	 when a currency crisis drove the overnight
interbank interest rate to unprecedented heights forcing a substantial devaluation of the Swedish
krona As discussed in Section  below the substantial economic downturn makes our business
cycle index particularly interesting from the point of view of examining asset  resale arguments
  Auction premiums and average recovery rates
Table  lists the average and median values of the auction premium and total recovery rates classi ed
by bankruptcy outcome goingconcern sales prepacks and piecemeal liquidations and the identity
of the buyer old or new owner The auction premium is de ned as pv
a
l
 	 ie the winning
bid price p in percent of the trustees liquidation value estimate of the assets sold in return for p
With few exceptions the auction sale excludes accounts receivables and other  nancial claims thus
v
a
l
 v
l


Table  does not list the value of the goingconcern premium for auction prepacks since
the trustees liquidation value estimate is made if at all when the prepack sales price is known

The average value of the auction premium ranges from a low of  for piecemeal liquidations
to a high of 	 for goingconcern sales Note that the  premium median   for piecemeal
liquidations supports our contention that the trustees liquidation estimate is just that a good
estimate of the winning bid value in a piecemeal liquidation auction
Table  also shows the average and median values of the total debt recovery rate column 
computed as the total market value of the assets sold in percent of total debt face value The
average total recovery rate ranges from a low of  for piecemeal liquidations to a high of  
for goingconcern sales

Furthermore column  of Table  shows the banks average realized
recovery rate which ranges from a low of  in piecemeal liquidations to a high of  in auction
prepacks Thus the bank recovers substantially more and junior debt substantially less than the
average for the  rm as a whole
Finally column  lists the banks liquidation recovery rate r
l
de ned in Lemma  ie r
l
 
maxminv
l
 sb 	   	 Since r
l
is the banks recovery rate if the auction were to produce
the trustees estimate of the piecemeal liquidation value it is computed using v
l
and not just v
a
l


The empirical correlation between v
l
and v
a
l
is 

In an auction prepack the trustee reports the  nal prepack sales price which includes the goingconcern premium
and typically does not publish the a separate estimate of the piecemeal liquidation value

See Thorburn  for a crosssectional analysis of the total recovery rates in our sample
	
Obviously r
l
represents a lower bound on the banks recovery rate since it ignores the goingconcern
premium produced by the auction The average value of r
l
ranges from a low of  median  
in piecemeal liquidations to a high of  median   in goingconcern sales Figure  shows
the frequency distribution of r
l
for the full sample of inbankruptcy auctions excluding prepacks
The bank receives full recovery at the trustees liquidation estimate r
l
 	 in  bankruptcy
 lings   and zero recovery r
l
  in another  cases The 	 intermediate cases are evenly
distributed across the range from  to 	
 Tests of overbidding vs resales
In the theoretical setting of Section  the bank oers to  nance a bidder in the auction This
increases auction liquidity if the bidder is  nancially constrained and does not otherwise have
access to credit Moreover the implication of overbidding is to raise the  nal auction price thus
counteracting tendencies for asset  resales In this section we examine the overbidding and
asset  resale hypotheses empirically
  Overbidding
The bankbidder overbidding hypothesis stated in Lemma  is tested using a crosssectional re
gression of the goingconcern premium denoted Prem on the banks liquidation recovery rate
r
l
 v
l
 sb   	 and a vector x of eleven other explanatory variables all de ned in Table 
Prem
j
 
	
 
 
r
lj

 
X
i

i
x
j
 u
j
 j  	  N 	
where u is a mean zero error term and N is the sample size Note that the  nal auction price p
incorporates the piecemeal liquidation value p  Prem v
a
l
 We represent Prem using both the
rate of return lnpv
a
l
 and the dollar value pv
a
l
 According to Lemma  the regression coe
cient

 
on r
l
should be negative indicating that greater liquidation recovery reduces overbidding
Recall that the liquidation recovery rate r
l
is observable at the beginning of the auction while
the  nal goingconcern premium Prem is established at the end Thus there is a natural causal
relationship if any running from r
l
to Prem through the incentives to overbid The reverse
	
causality is unlikely For the expected goingconcern premium to aect r
l
 the bank would need to
somehow impact increase v
l
prior to bankruptcy  ling Opportunistic asset transfers fraudulent
conveyance to the bank in the period prior to  ling risks being overturned by the court Perhaps
more importantly such transfers are unlikely to gain the necessary management cooperation be
cause it would hasten the very bankruptcy  ling they are at this point trying to avoid In sum we
take r
l
as exogenous to Prem and accordingly estimate its impact on Prem in a singleequation
setting

In addition to the liquidation recovery rate r
l
 the vector x includes six explanatory variables
de ned in Table  These are intended to capture  rm and dealspeci c characteristics that impact
Prem in addition to the eect of overbidding The variables are the pre ling book value of total
assets Size the industryadjusted pro t margin Profmarg the proportion of total debt that
is secured Secured a dummy indicating piecemeal liquidations Piecemeal the number of bids
submitted in the auctions Bids and Bankfin a dummy indicating that the old bank  nances
the winning bidder Table  lists summary statistics for these and other explanatory variables used
below
Table  shows the results of the crosssectional estimation Panel A uses the total sample
of goingconcern sales and piecemeal liquidations while Panel B restricts the sample to going
concern sales This restriction allows us to exploit information on the number of actual bidders and
bank  nancing not available for piecemeal liquidations

The third panel C shows the results
of estimating the regression across the sample of piecemeal liquidations only As explained below
this particular regression provides an additional check on the overbidding theory itself
Regardless of the regression speci cation in Table  in panels A and B lower liquidation
recovery rates lead to signi cantly greater auction premiums as predicted by our Lemma  When
using Prem  lnpv
a
l
 the estimate or 
 
is  in Panel A and ranges from 	 to 	 in
Panel B all with pvalues below  When using Prem  p v
a
l
 the estimate of 
 
divided by

Interestingly this is in contrast to the bidding environment in corporate takeovers As developed by Bulow
Huang and Klemperer  the size of the bidder toehold in the target aects the  nal bid premium through the
incentives of potential bidders to enter the auction A toehold bidder bids aggressively and exacerbates the winner	s
curse problem for nontoehold bidders in a common value auction setting Expectations of aggressive bidding may
deter competition and thus result in lower premiums Betton and Eckbo  estimate the impact of toeholds on
takeover premiums using a simultaneousequation system They  nd that greater initial bidder toeholds are in fact
associated with lower bid premiums

We also estimated the impact of the number of interested bidders variable Interest in Table  Inferences based
on Interest are similar to inferences based on Bids and we report results for the latter only
	
	 to ease exposition equals 	 in Panel A and 	 in Panel B again highly signi cant
Both the sign and signi cance of 
 
are virtually unchanged when adding additional explanatory
variables related to the  resale hypothesis in Table  Notice also that since the regressions in
Panel B exclude piecemeal liquidations where the goingconcern premium is close to zero Table
 the increase in the magnitude of the estimated value of 
 
further indicates robustness of the
overbidding incentives emanating from r
l
under Lemma 
Of the remaining explanatory variables in Table  the estimate of 

for Size is insigni cant
when Prem  lnpv
a
l
 and highly signi cant and positive as expected when the premium is
measured in dollar values Moreover for both speci cations of Prem the estimate of 

for
Piecemeal is negative and signi cant con rming the lack of goingconcern value for piecemeal
liquidations discussed earlier in Table 
The coe
cient 

for Bankfin is positive and signi cant across both speci cations of the
dependent variable Thus oldbank  nancing of the winning bidder has a positive impact on the
goingconcern premium that goes beyond the overbidding eect captured by r
l

Secured has a signi cant and negative impact on Prem  lnpv
a
l
 when Bankfin is not
included in the regression A greater proportion secured debt tends to reect a greater proportion
of assets in place and thus a higher v
l
 As a result Secured tends to be negatively correlated
with the goingconcern premium over v
l
 The fact that inclusion of Bankfin with a positive


 drives Secured to be insigni cant is evidence that the old bank tends to  nance  rms with
a low proportion assets in place and a correspondingly high goingconcern value emanating from
intangibles
Finally Panel C shows the results of restricting the sample to piecemeal liquidations If the bank
expects the auction to result in a piecemeal liquidation it has no incentive to overbid In terms of
Proposition 	 this is the case when the goingconcernvalue   is close to zero This is con rmed
by the fact that the  nal auction price in this subsample ends up very close to the liquidation
value itself recall that the median premium in Table  is  for piecemeal liquidations Thus
we predict an insigni cant coe
cient 
 
in this subsample This proposition is supported by the
results in Panel C where 
 
is statistically insigni cant with a pvalue of  when the premium is
de ned in logs and  when de ned in absolute values Note also that the remaining explanatory
variables in Panel C all receive statistically insigni cant coe
cients
	
In sum the results in Table  strongly support the overbidding theory relating r
l
to the size
of the auction premium We now turn to the alternative hypothesis namely that auctions tend to
produce  resale prices
  Asset resales
Shleifer and Vishny 	 argue that  rms tend to  le for bankruptcy when there is widespread
illiquidity in the  rms industry resulting in low intraindustry demand for the auctioned  rm
In their model industry outsiders are assumed to be both less e
cient at running the bankrupt
 rm and excluded from hiring industry insiders Given that industry insiders are cash constrained
industry outsiders tend to win the auction at relatively low  resale prices
	
The de nition of a  resale requires an empirical speci cation of the normal or uncon
strained value of the asset Pulvino 	 approaches this issue by estimating a theoretical pricing
model for his sample of aircrafts and compares actual sales prices to the model price He reports
that sales during times when the airline is  nancially distressed result in prices that are on average
	 lower than the model price In contrast sales prices during periods without  nancial distress
are on average  greater than the hedonic price Thus conditional on the model price being true
this evidence supports the detrimental eect of illiquidity predicted by the  resale hypothesis
Maksimovic and Phillips 	 use a CobbDouglas production function to model plant e
ciency
and examine to what extent plant sales allocate corporate assets to their most e
cient alternative
use Their evidence supports the e
ciency hypothesis and does not support the  resale argument
Again their empirical conclusions are necessarily conditional on the validity of the empirical model
for plant e
ciency
In this paper we avoid the need to specify a theoretical price benchmark for the value of
the  rm under its most e
cient allocation Although we cannot determine whether or not the
goingconcern premium on average suers from  resales this hypothesis also predicts that the
crosssectional variation in the premium depends on certain fundamentals Thus by adding these
fundamental factors to the crosssectional regression function for Prem we provide a test of the
 resale hypothesis after controlling for the eect of overbidding
	
Note that since the typical buyer debt  nances the acquisition much like in a leveraged buyout LBO it is
not a priori obvious that the cashonly requirement in Swedish bankruptcy auctions represents much of a binding
constraint

The results are shown in Table  The table reports results for Prem  lnpv
a
l
 as dependent
variable only as the dollar premium produces similar statistical inferences The explanatory vari
ables include six of the seven variables in Table  excluding Bids and an additional four variables
dictated by  resale hypotheses
 
The additional explanatory variables include the degree of industry distress Distress a busi
ness cycle index Cycle and a dummy variable for whether or not the buyer in the auction is an
industry outsider Outsider As de ned in Table  Distress is the fraction of Swedish  rms with
at least  employees and in the same digit SIC code as the bankrupt  rm that is  nancially
distressed in the year of the bankruptcy  ling A  rm is  nancially distressed if it has an interest
coverage ratio EBITDA plus interest income divided by interest expense of less than one or  les
for bankruptcy in the same calendar year The business cycle index Cycle is an equalweighted
monthly index where the elements are the GDP the producer price index aggregate consumption
the unemployment rate and the total number of bankruptcy  lings

We follow Stromberg 
and let the binary variable Outsider indicate when the buyer i is a  rm with a dierent digit
SIC code than the bankrupt  rm ii is not identi ed as a competitor and iii is not a former
employee or ownermanager
Moreover the regressions in Table  include the binary variable Saleback which takes a value
of one when the  rm is sold back to the old owner This variable is motivated by the model in
Stromberg  which implies that saleback transactions may take place at lower premiums
Essentially in his model the bank colludes with the owner of the bankrupt  rm to approve a sale
back prior to the bankruptcy auction As pointed out earlier the auction is mandatory following
bankruptcy  ling and the trustee cannot legally allow a saleback without competing bids

Thus
the realworld counterpart to Strombergs saleback event is a private outofcourt workout submit
ted as a prepackaged bankruptcy solution As discussed above Table  since the trustee does not
provide a piecemeal liquidation value for auction prepacks we cannot compute Prem for prepacks
However we have data on Prem for salebacks that took place in the open auctions Thus we use
the variable Saleback to test whether the average goingconcern premium is lower for salebacks
As shown in Table  inclusion of the four  resale variables does not alter the magnitude
 
Inclusion of Bids reduces the sample size from  to 

 and this variable receives an insigni cant coecient

The index elements are normalized by their mean and standard deviations before entering the index

This point is con rmed in our communications with the trustees
	
and signi cance of the overbidding variables This is true also for the subsample of piecemeal
liquidations in Panel C where the overbidding variable r
l
continues to be insigni cant as predicted
Moreover none of the  resale variables receive statistically signi cant coe
cients

In other words
there is no evidence that the goingconcern premium covaries with either industrywide distress
macroeconomic conditions the purchaser being an industry outsider or the auction resulting in a
saleback
In sum our regressions fail to support the  resale hypothesis This conclusion holds for sale
backs as well which we show generate normal premiums for competitive goingconcern sales

Since our regression controls for the eect of overbidding on the goingconcern premium a con
sistent explanation for our result is that overbidding eectively counteracts any tendency towards
 resales
 Auction bankruptcy and managerial incentives
In the overbidding theory of Section  as well as in the asset  resale hypotheses managerial
incentives are implicitly assumed to be aligned with shareholder interests In this section we
provide a brief discussion of potential ine
ciencies arising from adverse managerial incentives that
may arise ex ante in an auction bankruptcy setting
  Risk shifting and asset substitution
Thorburn 	 presents evidence that the Swedish auction system imposes signi cant personal
costs on the CEOs of the bankrupt  rms Only onethird of the CEOs are rehired by the buyer
in the auction and the median CEO experience an income loss of  over the twoyear period
following the year of bankruptcy  ling Several authors eg Aghion Hart and Moore 	
Franks Nyborg and Torous 	 White 	 Hart  argue that high personal costs
of bankruptcy tend to induce management to undertake activities that are designed to delay a
perhaps inevitable  ling The argument is an application of the asset substitution risk shifting
incentives raised by Jensen and Meckling 	 That is incumbent managers have an incentive

This is true also if we include only a single one of the four variables at a time

Recall from Table  that salebacks take place in multiplebid auctions with an average of  bids and 
 interested
bidders per case

to liquidate lowrisk assets and invest the proceeds in highrisk projects

Managerial overinvestment in risky projects arguably reduces the goingconcern value of the
bankrupt  rm

Thus the evidence in Thorburn  	 on debt recovery rates  rm sur
vival rates and postbankruptcy performance in Swedish bankruptcy auctions is at least indirectly
relevant for judging the empirical relevance of costly risk shifting Her evidence indicates that the
reorganized  rms are generally healthy relative to their nonbankrupt industry peers Also the
evidence on large goingconcern premiums above liquidation values reported in this paper are
somewhat di
cult to square with the costly riskshifting story
It appears that the reorganized  rms in Sweden are also healthy compared to  rms reorganized
under Chapter 		 in the US Thorburn  reports debt recovery rates that average  for
going concern sales which compares to 	 median recovery reported by Franks and Torous 	
for a sample of Chapter 		  rms with data on the market value of debt Moreover as mentioned
in the introduction  rms survive Swedish auction bankruptcy as going concerns at a rate that is
no less than the small rm survivorship rate in Chapter 		 White 	 Also the evidence in
Hotchkiss 	 that  rms emerging from Chapter 		 on average underperform their respective
industries is in contrast to the results in Thorburn 	 that  rms surviving the auction perform
at par with their nonbankrupt industry rivals In sum while not a settled issue there is little
support for the costly asset substitution hypothesis in the available empirical evidence
  Managerial underinvestment in human capital
Berkovitch Israel and Zender 	 	 point to another potential problem induced by a
bankruptcy auction system managers may underinvest in  rmspeci c human capital In their
model the  rm is  nanced by outside debt with face value F  and the managers compensation
equals the residual  rm value after the debt is paid o In this setting the  rstbest level of man
agerial investment in human capital occurs only if managers are not expropriated by creditors ex
post Since the manager is the residual claimant this is equivalent to Myers 	 underinvestment
problem In states where the  rm value is below the face value of debt the managers incentive to

Gertner and Scharfstein  examine the eect of Chapter  bankruptcy on corporate investment incentives
Hoshi Kashyap and Scharfstein  report that  nancially distressed  rms in Japan that belong to a Kereitsu
group tend to maintain a greater level of investment compared to nonKeiretsu  rms

If you bet and win you avoid bankruptcy If you bet and lose you  le for bankruptcy

invest is reduced
BerkovitchIsraelZender propose the following solution allow the manager to always buy out
the debt at v
l
 F whenever the true  rm value v is such that v
l
 v  F  The buyout mechanism
they propose is a bankruptcy auction where no outside bids are greater than v
l
 Speci cally since
the creditormust be assumed to be equally informed as the managers otherwise it would not supply
the initial debt capital in this model the creditor must also be restricted from participating in the
auction

Using the intuition from the BerkovitchIsraelZender model one might argue that the bank
bidder coalition that is the key element of our theory will lead to ine
cient managerial investment
in human capital However this does not necessarily follow since the optimality of the coalition
bidding strategy holds for more general managerial compensation contracts This is particularly
relevant when managerial human capital formation is only one of many inputs to the creation of
 rm value In this case a combination of bankbidder coalition bidding and a sidepayment to
management may be more e
cient than allowing the management team to stay on The latter
solution would also address the concern that the incumbent management may be the cause of the
 nancial distress
 Conclusion
We study the role of distressed bank debt in aecting the outcome of Swedish bankruptcy auctions
The auction determines the goingconcern premium ie the premium over the piecemeal liquidation
value to be paid for the right to acquire the bankrupt  rm as a going concern We show that the bank
has an incentive to  nance a bidder and induce the coalition to overbid Moreover the coalitions
optimal bid equals the revenuemaximizing reservation price of a monopolist seller constrained by
the face value of creditors senior and junior to the bank
At the beginning of the auction the trustee announces a marketvalue based estimate of the
 rms piecemeal liquidation value We show that the expected amount of overbidding in the auction
is decreasing in the banks recovery were it to receive the piecemeal liquidation value only Since

Aghion Hart and Moore  take issue with the managerial incentive rationale for softening the bankruptcy
code and suggest a simpler solution lower the  rm	s debtequity ratio ex ante If the stateprovided bankruptcy
mechanism is harsh it seems relatively easy for a  rm to soften it ex ante If those people choosing the corporation	s
 nancial structure wish to protect managers from bankruptcy they can do so by choosing a low debtequity ratio

both the  nal auction premium and the piecemeal liquidation value are observable this overbid
ding theory is testable We perform crosssectional regressions using a large sample of Swedish
bankruptcy auctions The results yield strong support for the overbidding theory
Controlling for the incentives to overbid we also examine asset  resale arguments which hold
that the auctions tend to attract relatively lowvaluation buyers This is an issue if the allcash
auctions take place during times of industrywide  nancial distress so competitors are cash con
strained and do not bid Or it may reect opportunistic dealings between the bank and the old
owners in a saleback arrangement
We  nd no evidence that the goingconcern premium generated by the auctions is lower in
periods with severe industrywide distress nor in business cycle downturns Moreover the auction
premium is no lower when the buyer is identi ed as an industry outsider Also we reject the
hypothesis that salebacks lead to lower average premiums The latter result may be a direct
reection of the fact the salebacks take place in active auctions with an average of  bids and 
interested bidders much like those resulting in nonsaleback going concern sales In sum we  nd
no support for asset  resale arguments Since we control for overbidding incentives a consistent
explanation is that overbidding incentives eectively counteract  resale tendencies in relatively
illiquid auctions
While an auction bankruptcy system that imposes signi cant costs on managers in principle may
induce suboptimal managerial actions ex ante there is mounting evidence that  rms reorganized
in the Swedish bankruptcy system are in fact relatively healthy The auction system has the
additional bene t over a Chapter 		 type of system in that it makes it easier to replace incumbent
management Several authors point to the promanagement bias inherent in Chapter 		 where
managers retain substantial control rights

This bias does not exist in the Swedish system since
managerial employment contracts are automatically terminated upon bankruptcy  ling By being
hard on incumbent management the auction bankruptcy code removes a potentially serious
obstacle entrenched management to an e
cient restructuring ex post The eect of this is to
reduce the cost of debt  nancing ex ante

See eg Jensen  Bradley and Rosenzweig  Aghion Hart and Moore 

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Table 1 
Bidding characteristics for 263 private Swedish firms filing for bankruptcy, 1988-1991, split by 
auction outcome. For going concern sales, the table shows a further break down by whether the 
buyer of the bankrupt firm is the old owner (Saleback=1) or not (Saleback=0). The table reports the 
mean, while the median and number of observations are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Total number 
of cases 
Number of 
interested bidders  
Number of 
actual bids  
Duration of 
auction (days) 1 
All auctions 
 263 5.5 (3.0; 156) 3.6 (2.0; 146) 25.3 (14.5; 46) 
Going concern sales 2 
 147 5.7 (3.0; 102) 3.2 (2.0; 95) 24.2 (15.0; 40) 
Saleback=1 90 5.3 (3.0; 55) 3.0 (1.5; 52) 23.4 (15.0; 17) 
Saleback=0 54 6.1 (4.0; 46) 3.5 (3.0; 42) 24.8 (15.0; 23) 
Auction prepacks 2 
 53 1.5 (1.0: 33) 1.2 (1.0; 33) - - 
Piecemeal liquidations 
 60 11.4 (5.0; 20) 9.8 (5.0; 17) 15.0 (14.0; 5) 
 
1 The duration is the number of days during which the trustee accepts bids for the assets of the bankrupt 
firm. 
2 Due to missing information on the identity of the buyer, the “All cases” categories contain more cases than 
the sum of the subcategories “Saleback” and “New owner”. 
 
Table 2 
Average auction premiums and recovery rates (in percent) for a sample of 263 private Swedish 
firms filing for auction bankruptcy, 1988-1991. The table shows a split by bankruptcy outcome. 
Median and number of observations are shown in parentheses. 
 
Auction premium 1 Total recovery rate 2 Bank recovery rate 2 Bank liquidation 
recovery rate 3 
All auctions 
92.1 (8.7; 188) 34.5 (33.1; 263) 69.3 (82.8; 238) 59.9 (68.1; 196) 
Going concern sales 
125.3 (13.5; 135) 39.0 (38.1; 147) 76.3 (89.3; 141) 65.6 (76.8; 141) 
Auction prepacks 4 
n/a  32.1   (31.3; 53) 77.1 (91.3; 40) n/a  
Piecemeal liquidations 
7.6 (1.6; 50) 25.6 (21.2; 60) 45.7 (40.4; 55) 45.3 (39.0; 55) 
1 Auction premium is defined here as 1)( −alvp , where p is the price paid in the auction and alv  is the 
trustee’s estimate of the liquidation value of the auctioned assets.  
2 Recovery rate is the payoff to debtholders as a fraction of the face value of their debt claims. 
3 Bank liquidation recovery rate lr is the bank’s recovery rate if the bankruptcy proceeding produces total 
proceeds equal to the trustee’s estimated liquidation value lv , defined as [ ][ ]1,)(min,0max bsvr ll −=  and 
where s and b are the face values of debt senior to the bank and the bank’s debt, respectively.  The trustee’s 
estimate lv  is the sum of 
a
lv  and assets that are collected or sold outside the bankruptcy auction, e.g., 
accounts receivables, financial claims and non-core real estate holdings. 
4 Auction premiums are not meaningful for auction prepacks since the trustee estimates alv  after the going 
concern price has been negotiated. 
Table 3 
Description of the explanatory variables used in the auction premium estimations presented in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Label Variable definition 
A: Regressors for overbidding (Lemma 5) 
lr  Bank liquidation recovery rate if the auction produces the trustee’s estimate of the 
firm’s liquidation value lv , [ ]1,0∈lr . 
Size Natural log of the book value of total assets as reported in the firm’s last financial 
statement prior to filing. 
Profmarg Difference between the firm’s pre-filing operating margin, defined as EBITDA 
divided by sales, and the contemporaneous median operating margin for the 
population of Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and the same 4-digit SIC 
code as the bankrupt firm. 
Secured Fraction secured debt of the firm’s total debt at filing. 
Piecemeal Binary variable indicating that the firm is liquidated piecemeal (xj=1) vs. sold as 
going concern (xj=0). 
Interest Number of interested potential bidders in auctions where the firm is sold as a going 
concern.  
Bids Number of bids submitted in auctions where the firm is sold as a going concern.  
Bankfin Binary variable indicating that the buyer of a going concern is financed by the filing 
firm’s old bank (xj=1) vs. by a new bank (xj=0). 
B: Regressors for asset fire-sales  
Distress Fraction of all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and the same 4-digit SIC 
code as the sample firm that either reports an interest coverage ratio (defined as the 
sum of EBITDA and interest income divided by interest expense) of less than one or 
files for bankruptcy in the calendar year of the sample firm’s bankruptcy filing.  
Cycle Equal-weighted monthly index of the gross national product (+), the producer price 
index (+), aggregate consumption (+), unemployment rate (-) and number of 
corporate bankruptcy filings (-). The variables are normalized with their mean and 
standard deviation before entering the index. 
Outsider Binary variable indicating that the buyer of a going concern is an industry outsider 
(xj=1) vs. an industry insider (xj=0). Following Strömberg (2000), outsider sales are 
cases where the buyer (i) is a firm with a different 3-digit SIC code than the 
bankrupt firm, (ii) is not identified as a competitor of the bankrupt firm, or (iii) is 
not a former employee or owner/manager of the bankrupt firm.  
Saleback Binary variable indicating that the firm is sold as a going concern to the old owner 
(xj=1) vs. to a new owner (xj=0). 
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in the auction premium estimations 
presented in Tables 5 and 6, split by auction outcome (going concern or piecemeal liquidation). 
Sample of 196 private Swedish firms that filed for bankruptcy during 1988-1991. The variables are 
defined in Table 3. 
 
 Going concern sales  Piecemeal liquidations  
Variable Mean Median Std dev N Mean Median Std dev N 
A: Regressors for overbidding (Lemma 5) 
lr  0.66 0.77 0.35 141 0.45 0.39 0.35 55 
Size 16.0 15.8 0.97 147 15.9 15.9 1.17 58 
Profmarg -0.05 -0.04 0.09 146 -0.08 -0.04 0.23 58 
Secured 0.40 0.38 0.23 147 0.42 0.41 0.25 60 
Piecemeal 0.00 0.00 0.00 147 1.00 1.00 0.00 60 
Interest 5.67 3.00 6.69 102 - - - - 
Bids 3.24 2.00 3.64 95 - - - - 
Bankfin 0.46 0.00 0.50 94 - - - - 
B: Regressors for asset fire-sales 
Distress 0.41 0.38 0.15 147 0.44 0.38 0.17 60 
Cycle 0.26 0.66 2.22 147 0.09 0.17 2.42 60 
Outsider 0.23 0.00 0.42 147 - - - - 
Saleback 0.61 1.00 0.49 144 - - - - 
Table 5 
 
Coefficients from OLS estimations of the auction premium for 186 Swedish firms auctioned in bankruptcy 1988-1991, and sold as going concerns 
or liquidated piecemeally. The dependent variable Prem is defined as either )(ln alvp  or alvp − , where p  is the price paid in the auction and alv  is 
the trustee’s estimate of the liquidation value of the auctioned assets. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. Parentheses show p-values 
and, for the adjusted R2, degrees of freedom.1 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Regressors for overbidding (Lemma 5)  
Prem Constant lr  Size Profmarg Secured Piecemeal Bids Bankfin Adj. R2 F-value N 
 0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  6β  7β     
A: Sample of going concern sales and piecemeal liquidations 2 
)(ln alvp  0.91     
(0.35) 
-0.88   
(0.00) 
0.02     
(0.78) 
-0.05   
(0.91) 
-0.65    
(0.04) 
-0.58    
(0.00) 
  0.14     
(df=5) 
6.75       
(0.000) 
173 
a
lvp −  -10.16 
(0.00) 
-1.89  
(0.00) 
0.78     
(0.00) 
0.41   
(0.73) 
-0.35    
(0.68) 
-1.20    
(0.00) 
  0.16     
(df=5) 
8.37       
(0.000) 
186 
B: Sample of going concern sales  
)(ln alvp  1.70   
(0.21) 
-1.34    
(0.00) 
-0.02  
(0.78) 
-0.70  
(0.47) 
-0.46 
(0.28) 
  0.36  
(0.03) 
0.26     
(df=5) 
6.94       
(0.00) 
84 
)(ln alvp  2.08   
(0.12) 
-1.22    
(0.00) 
-0.03  
(0.73) 
0.73   
(0.50) 
-0.82 
(0.08) 
 -0.04   
(0.12) 
 0.19     
(df=5) 
4.93       
(0.00) 
85 
a
lvp −  -23.9 
(0.00) 
-3.35  
(0.02) 
1.68   
(0.00) 
-1.29 
(0.81) 
-0.49    
(0.84) 
 -0.16  
(0.48) 
2.08  
(0.03) 
0.29     
(df=6) 
4.75       
(0.00) 
56 
C: Sample of piecemeal liquidations 
)(ln alvp  -0.62     
(0.75) 
-0.12    
(0.74) 
0.01     
(0.69) 
-0.10    
(0.84) 
-0.54    
(0.37) 
   -0.08     
(df=4) 
0.22       
(0.926) 
44 
a
lvp −  -2.04     
(0.29) 
-0.25    
(0.53) 
0.16     
(0.22) 
 0.14    
(0.81) 
-0.73    
(0.24) 
   -0.04    
(df=4) 
0.56       
(0.696) 
44 
1 For reporting purposes, the coefficient estimates have been divided by 1,000,000 when using alvp − as dependent variable. 
2 The sample reduction when using )(ln alvp  is caused by the elimination of cases where alvp < . 
Table 6 
 
Coefficients from OLS estimations of the auction premium for 186 Swedish firms auctioned in bankruptcy 1988-1991, and sold as going concerns 
or liquidated piecemeally. The dependent variable Prem is defined as )(ln alvp , where p  is the price paid in the auction and alv  is the trustee’s 
estimate of the liquidation value of the auctioned assets. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. Parentheses show p-values and, for the 
adjusted R2, degrees of freedom. 
 
  Regressors for overbidding (Lemma 5)  Regressors for asset-fire sales  
Con-
stant 
lr  Size Prof-
marg 
Secured Piece-
meal 
Bankfin Dis-
tress 
Cycle Out-
sider 
Sale-
back  
Adjus-
ted R2 
F-value N 
0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  7β  8β  9β  10β  11β     
A: Sample of going concern sales and piecemeal liquidations 
0.65   
(0.52) 
-0.86  
(0.00) 
0.03   
(0.69) 
-0.06 
(0.89) 
-0.66  
(0.03) 
-0.57  
(0.00) 
 0.30  
(0.51) 
0.02  
(0.55) 
  0.14   
(df=7) 
5.01   
(0.00) 
173 
B: Sample of going concern sales 
0.60   
(0.62) 
-1.10  
(0.00) 
0.05   
(0.55) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
-0.97  
(0.01) 
  0.30  
(0.59) 
0.02  
(0.61) 
  0.13 
(df=6) 
4.31   
(0.00) 
130 
1.59   
(0.19) 
-1.15  
(0.00) 
-0.01   
(0.88) 
0.20 
(0.82) 
-0.76  
(0.04) 
  0.27  
(0.62) 
0.01  
(0.76) 
-0.31  
(0.19) 
-0.02  
(0.92) 
0.16 
(df=8) 
3.95   
(0.00) 
126 
1.92   
(0.17) 
-1.34  
(0.00) 
-0.02   
(0.81) 
-0.69 
(0.49) 
-0.48  
(0.26) 
 0.36    
(0.03) 
-0.60  
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Figure 1 
 
Bank-bidder coalition’s optimal bid price cp as a function of the coalition’s private valuation 1v  
and the face value of the firm’s creditors, assuming a common liquidation value lv of 0 and that 
bidders’ private going-concern valuations are distributed uniformly over the interval [0,1]. The 
face value of creditors senior to the bank is denoted s  and the face value of the bank’s claim is 
denoted b . The coalition bid price with full overbidding is denoted *p , which in the case of the 
uniform distribution equals 2)1( 1* += vp . The figure shows that the optimal coalition price cp  
varies between 1v  and 
*p  depending on the value of 1v  relative to s  and bs + . In the four 
regions, Regions I and IV imply no overbidding )( 1vpc = , Region II implies full overbidding 
)( *ppc = , and Region III implies partial overbidding )( *1 ppv c << . The shaded area indicates the 
magnitude of coalition overbidding for alternative values of 1v . 
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Figure 2 
 
A monopolist’s expected-profit-maximizing selling price pm in a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the 
bankrupt firm in an open, ascending auction with zero bidding costs. Bidders’ private valuations 
v are uniformly distributed with distribution and density functions )(vG and )(vg . The seller ‘s 
opportunity cost is mv . 
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Figure 3 
 
Potential auction outcomes with bank-bidder coalition overbidding )( 1vpc ≥  in the bankruptcy 
auction.  cp is the optimal bid by the coalition, 1v  is bidder 1’s private valuation of the firm and 
2v  is the private valuation of the rival bidder. Bidder 2 bids his private valuation 2v . 
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 Figure 4 
Key outcomes in Swedish auction bankruptcy. 
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Figure 5 
Frequency distribution for the number of potential buyers indicating a serious interest in bidding 
in the auction. Sample of 102 Swedish bankruptcy auctions of private firms sold as going 
concerns, 1988-1991. 
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Figure 6 
Frequency distribution for the number of actual bids submitted in the auction. Sample of 95 
bankruptcy auctions of private Swedish firms sold as going concerns, 1988-1991. 
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Figure 7 
Frequency distribution for the bank liquidation recovery rate lr , defined as  
[ ][ ]1,)(min,0max bsvr ll −= , where lv  is the trustee’s estimate of the liquidation value of the 
firm, and s  and b  are the face values of claims senior to the bank, and of the bank, 
respectively. Sample of 196 private firms auctioned as going concerns or liquidated 
piecemeal in Swedish bankruptcy auctions. 
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